This paper examines the impact of limited liability on equity prices and expected returns. I develop an equity pricing model that links investors'preference for downside loss protection to the limited liability feature of equity. The hedging value of limited liability increases with the systematic risk of …rms'assets. For su¢ ciently high levels of systematic risk, expected equity returns decline as leverage increases. Empirically, I …nd a strong negative relation between average returns and …nancial leverage for …rms with high equity covariance risk. These …ndings suggest that the limited liability feature of equity plays an important role in driving the negative relation between average returns and default risk.
Introduction
Should expected equity returns increase or decrease with default risk? A number of recent studies …nd average equity returns are lower for …rms with high default risk than for …rms with little default risk. 1 The negative relation between default risk and equity returns appears when either accounting based or risk-neutral measures of …nancial distress serve as proxies for default risk. In addition, a similar negative relation exists between …nancial leverage and equity returns (Gomes and Schmid (2007) , George and Hwang (2008) ).
The negative relation between equity returns and default risk present a dilemma. Default risk depends on …nancial leverage and the risk characteristics of a …rm's assets. For example, if …rm risk remains constant, then pronounced …nancial leverage increases the likelihood that negative shocks to …rm value leave equity holders unable to meet bond payments. Thus default risk increases. Furthermore, …nancial leverage magni…es equity holders'exposure to underlying …rm asset risk (Modigliani and Miller (1958) ). If investors demand compensation for bearing higher risk, then expected equity returns should also increase with …nancial leverage. Thus, expected equity returns should increase, not decrease, as default risk increases
Hamada ((1972) , Galai and Masulis (1979) ).
I examine whether the value of limited liability protection explains the negative relation between average equity returns and …nancial leverage. Limited liability provides downside loss protection for equity holders by limiting equity cash- ‡ows at zero, while o¤ering unbounded upside gains. I derive an equity pricing relation that shows how the value of limited liability varies with …rm risk and …nancial leverage and how it impacts expected equity returns.
The value of limited liability increases with the systematic risk of …rm assets. Limited liability insures equity holders against negative shocks to …rm value. For example, …rms with positive asset betas are more likely to receive negative shocks to …rm value when the market declines. Limited liability lessens the impact of these shocks by limiting the potential losses borne by equity holders. In the event of default, bond holders bear the risk of …rms'cash ‡ows, and they are more likely to bear the risk in bad states of the world. Thus, the hedging value of limited liability is greatest for …rms with high asset systematic risk. The value of limited liability also increases with …nancial leverage. As leverage increases, the likelihood of drawing the bene…t of limited liability, with limited losses and unlimited upside potential, increases. I show the value of limited liability exceeds compensation for bearing systematic risk for …rms with high asset systematic risk and pronounced levels of …nancial leverage. In addition, as leverage increases, changes in the value of limited liability dominate changes in compensation of equity systematic risk. Thus, expected equity returns may decrease as leverage increases.
The theoretical results imply that the negative equity return-leverage relation should be strongest for …rms with high equity covariance risk. I …nd empirical support for this within portfolios of US stocks sorted by equity covariance risk and …nancial leverage. For …rms in the highest quintile of equity covariance risk and lowest quintile of leverage, average returns are 1.33 percent per month, while for …rms in the highest quintile of leverage, returns decline to -0.114 percent per month. Equity returns for the lowest quintile of covariance risk also decrease with leverage, although the declines are much less dramatic, from 1.16 to 0.66 percent per month. Thus, the negative equity return-…nancial leverage relation is strongest for …rms with high equity covariance risk.
Financial leverage and default risk impact expected equity returns by altering expected equity cash ‡ows or the risk of the cash- ‡ows. The literature has identi…ed several channels through which …nancial leverage impacts expected cash ‡ows or risk.
Renegotiation of debt and shareholder advantage
Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008) link the negative relation between average equity returns and default risk to the bargaining power that equity investors have over bondholders in the event of default. Prior to default, bond holders face uncertainty about the value of …rms' assets, and may prefer to delay bankruptcy when the cost of liquidating the …rm is large.
Thus, equity holders may have the ability to extract rents from bond holders by threatening default, and renegotiating the bond indenture; expected equity returns may decline as the probability of default increase. In a related paper, Garlappi and Yan (2007) show that equity systematic risk also decreases at high levels of default probability when there is the possibility of violations of absolute priority rules. Taken together, the two papers suggest that equity risk and average returns may decrease when leverage is high; the e¤ect is greatest for …rms with few cash ‡ow constraints, such as low R&D expenditure …rms. Also, …rms with concentrated debt holders, such as small …rms that typically rely on bank loans, are less likely to have an advantage over debt holders in default.
Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2008) …nd the negative relation between equity returns and default risk is strongest for …rms with few R&D expenditures and for large …rms. In contrast, I …nd that small …rms, not large …rms, with high covariance risk have a stronger negative relation between returns and leverage. In addition, I …nd little di¤erence in returns for low and high R&D expenditure …rms. This suggests that the impact of the value of limited 4 liability on equity returns is independent of the e¤ects of shareholders power to renegotiate debt contracts. 2
Financial distress costs
George and Hwang (2008) consider the e¤ects of …nancial distress costs on the negative relation between equity returns and …nancial leverage. When faced with …nancial market imperfections, the choice of the level of debt in a …rm's capital structure re ‡ects the costs of …nancial distress to the …rm. Firms with higher …nancial distress costs tend to select lower levels of …nancial leverage. In addition, since distress costs occur when the …rm is close to bankruptcy, these costs may costs magnify the e¤ects on …nancial leverage on equity systematic risk. Thus, …rms with low distress costs have lower exposure to systematic risk, low expected equity returns and high leverage. Firms with little leverage and high distress costs have higher equity systematic risk, and corresponding higher average equity returns.
Therefore, …nancial distress costs may drive the negative relation between average equity returns and …nancial leverage relation. On the other hand, I show for …rms in the highest quintile of equity systematic risk, there is little variation in systematic risk as leverage increases. Thus, variation in systematic risk does not appear to drive variation in average returns across leverage quintiles.
In a related paper, Gomes and Shmidt (2008) examine the impact of …nancial distress on …rms with di¤erent growth opportunities. Firms with high growth options tend to have higher levels of …nancial distress costs, higher asset betas and expected equity returns and lower levels of debt. Conversely, …rms with lower growth options relative to assets in place have lower asset betas and expected equity returns and higher leverage. Thus, the negative relation between equity returns and …nancial leverage comes from the joint …nancing-investment decision of …rms. Moreover, …rms with few growth opportunities should have a positive relation between equity returns and …nancial leverage. However, I …nd little di¤er-ence in the negative relation between returns and leverage for …rms partitioned by the level of R&D expenditures.
Agency costs and the equity return-leverage relation
Agency costs may lead to lower expected equity returns for …rms with pronounced leverage. Limited liability induces agency con ‡icts between bond holders and equity holders.
Equity holders bene…t if the …rm does well, while if the …rm performs poorly, and equity holders default, bond holders bear the losses. Thus, equity holders have incentives to shift from projects with low asset variance to projects with high asset variance (Galai and Masulis (1976) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) Bhandari (1988) and Fama and French (1992) …nd that average returns increase with …nancial leverage, although Fama and French (1992) note that the positive relation does not persist after controlling for book-to-market. In contrast, Vassalou and Xing (2004) present evidence that default risk is systematic, and is priced in the cross section of returns;
thus default risk has a positive risk premium. Furthermore, both size and book-to-market e¤ects appear to be driving largely by default risk. 4 Da and Gao (2007) , however, note that institutional selling intensi…es immediately after …rms experience large increases in …nancial distress; stock prices drop as a concession to dealers who supply liquidity to institutional investors. After the temporary liquidity shock, prices increase leading to positive returns in the period following a large increase in …nancial distress. Da and Gao suggest that the positive risk premium reported in Vassalou and Xing (2004) may be related to liquidity risk.
The Price of Limited Liability Equity
Consider an economy of …rms worth A t in the current period and A t+1 next period.
Firms issue two claims on their assets. The …rst is a zero-coupon debt claim that pays the face value D i;t+1 if the value of …rm i exceeds the debt's face value. If …rm value is below face value, the equity holders default, and the debt holders get the …rm value, A i;t+1 . The second claim is an equity claim that pays the di¤erence between …rm value and the face value of debt, A i;t+1 D i;t+1 , if …rm value is greater than the face value of debt, and pays zero otherwise. I assume …rms'investment policies are independent of …nancing policy and managers do not use …nancing decisions to signal future …rm prospects. Furthermore, …rms can costlessly default, have free access to external funds, and pay no taxes. To insure no arbitrage opportunities exist, the price of the equity and debt claims equal the value of the …rm, A t .
A representative investor determines the value of equity. The investor maximizes expected utility of next period wealth, W t+1 ; by allocating initial wealth between equity and debt claims to …rm assets, and a risk-free asset that pays unity at t + 1 . From the …rst order conditions for expected utility maximization, the price of equity depends on the equity payout and the marginal utility of investor wealth at t + 1 (Beja (1971) ).
u 0 ( ) is the investor's marginal utility of wealth, X i;E;t+1 is the equity payout next period, and R f;t+1 is the one-period risk free rate. The properties of the covariance operator imply 9 that the price of equity equals
The price of the equity claim depends on its expected cash ‡ow and a covariance risk adjustment that decreases prices for payouts that do poorly when future wealth innovations are low.
The covariance risk adjustment re ‡ects investors'preference for the downside loss protection embedded in limited liability. To show this, I assume investor wealth and the value of …rm assets at t + 1 are normally distributed. Thus, investor wealth and the equity payout at t+1 have a joint truncated normal distribution. The covariance risk adjustment is decomposed using the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose …rm asset value, A i;t+1 , and the investor's wealth portfolio, W t+1 , are normally distributed. The investor's marginal utility of wealth,
and an equity claim that pays X i;E;t+1 = A i;t+1 D i;t+1 if A i;t+1 > D i;t+1 ; and zero otherwise,
where W A i is the covariance between asset value and wealth, A i is the asset value standard
) is the probability that equity holders avoid default, N W is the value of wealth invested in the portfolio of risky assets at t, and
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 extends Stein's lemma (Stein (1973 ), Rubinstein (1973 ). Stein's lemma states that if the wealth portfolio, W t+1 , and a payout, X t+1 ; have a joint normal distribution, then the covariance risk adjustment equals the average change in marginal utility over all future wealth outcomes, E (u 00 (W t+1 )) ; multiplied by the covariance between wealth and the payout.
Applying Lemma 1 to Equation 4, the price of the equity claim equals
Equity prices depend on expected equity payouts, compensation for bearing covariance risk (the second term) and on how investors value the limited liability feature of equity (the third term). When the probability of default is zero, investors do not bene…t from limited liability protection. Thus, the value of limited liability is zero, and equity prices depend on asset covariance risk and expected …rm value net of the face value of debt (Hamada (1973) , Rubinstein (1973) ).
When the probability of default is positive, equity prices also depend on investors skewness preference,
; and …rm risk characteristics. Skewness preference measures the curvature of marginal utility, or how much investors dislike declines in wealth relative to how much they like gains in wealth. Investors prefer positive skewness and dislike negative skewness under certain restrictions on curvature of the utility function. If investors do not decrease their holdings in risky assets as their level of wealth increases, and have positive marginal utility at all levels of wealth, then they will prefer positive skewness and dislike negative skewness (Scott and Horvath (1980) ). This implies that u 000 (W t ) is greater than zero. For …rms with positive asset covariance, the value of limited liability is positive.
Firm risk characteristics, along with the level of …nancial leverage, determine skewness of the equity payout. Limited liability protection induces skewness in the ex-ante distribution of equity returns by truncating equity cash- ‡ows at zero; the skewness increases with …nancial leverage. In addition, skewness increases as either asset covariance or asset idiosyncratic risk increases. The next section examines the impact of asset risk on expected equity returns.
Firm Risk, Financial Leverage and Expected Equity Returns
This section illustrates how the relation between leverage and expected equity returns depends on …rm risk characteristics. Expected equity return equals the expected equity cash ‡ow when …rm value is normally distributed divided by the pricing equation for equity (Equation 5) 6 Firm asset value and investor wealth are normally distributed at t + 1 ; so 6 The expected equity cash ‡ow equals
…rm value at t depends on …rm exposure to asset systematic risk (Rubinstein (1973) ). The expected return of the …rm's assets and the investor's wealth portfolio are
is the asset beta for …rm i and 2 W is the variance of the investor's wealth portfolio. The risk-free asset is in zero net supply, so the representative investor invests all wealth in the risky portfolio of assets. I re-normalize prices in terms of the risk-free asset.
Firm value equals 1 at time t, so the expected …rm value in the following period equals E (R A;i;t+1 ) : I vary the debt-asset ratio,
, from 0 to 0.99, and use expected …rm value to identify D i;t+1 .
In the examples below, absolute risk aversion equals -4, and the annual standard deviation of the wealth portfolio is 14 percent per year. This implies the risk premium for the wealth portfolio corresponds to 7.84 percent per year. The skewness preference parameter,
; equals 1.5 times the square of absolute risk aversion. Figure 1 shows expected equity returns for di¤erent asset betas and leverage ratios.
Expected equity returns decline as leverage increases. When the asset beta equals 1.8, equity returns decrease for debt-asset ratios above 0.68, from a peak of 29 percent to 0.7 percent (when leverage equals 0.99). Within the framework of the model, assets with higher covariance risk produce payouts that are worse when overall wealth falls. Limited liability See Kotz, Balakrishnan and Johnson (2000) .
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hedges against these declines, and leads to lower expected returns at high levels of leverage.
For lower levels of leverage, expected equity returns decline, although the magnitude of the decline is less pronounced. Thus, when the asset beta equals 1, expected returns decrease from a peak of 17 percent to 14 percent. The declines in equity returns even at low levels of asset systematic risk suggests that limited liability plays an important role in determining expected equity returns.
Empirical Analysis

Data Sample and Summary Statistics
The data consists of CRSP monthly stock returns merged with the COMPUSTAT annual industrial …le and spans January, 1965 to December, 2003 . Da and Gao (2005 …nd that liquidity e¤ects may obscure the relation between default risk and equity returns. Thus, I
drop …rms whose stock price is lower than …ve dollars per share and exclude observations for …rms whose prices in CRSP are an average of the end-of-month bid and ask prices.
Furthermore, I remove …rms whose primary business focuses on …nancial services (SIC codes 60-62 and 67). These …rms may have pronounced …nancial leverage that is unrelated to default risk. Financial leverage is de…ned as the book value of debt divided by the market value of equity. Debt equals debt in current liabilities (data item 34) plus long term debt (data item 9), both from COMPUSTAT. I lag accounting information by six months to insure it is publicly available during the ranking period. The market value of equity equals shares outstanding times price per share; both are from CRSP.
To classify …rms based on covariance risk and …nancial leverage, I perform a two-way dependent sort. I …rst sort …rms into quintiles based on the level of equity covariance risk.
For each …rm in month t, I use the previous 36 months equity returns along with the CRSP 14 value weighted index to calculate the sample covariance. Within each quintile of covariance risk, I further sort …rms into quintiles based on the level of …nancial leverage during the previous month, and form value-weighted portfolios for each covariance-leverage quintile.
3.2 Post-ranking Equity Returns, Covariance and Financial Leverage Table 1 , Panel A lists the average equity returns. Equity returns decrease with …nancial leverage. Furthermore, the negative relation between average equity returns and leverage is most pronounced for …rms with high equity covariance risk. For …rms in the highest covariance quintile, equity returns decrease from 1.32 percent per month for …rms in the lowest quintile of …nancial leverage to -0.10 percent per month for …rms in the highest quintile of …nancial leverage. Within the highest quintile of covariance risk, the di¤erence between low and high-leverage …rms is large, around -1.4 percent per month, and highly statistically signi…cant (the t-statistic equals -5.42). Average equity returns for …rms in the lower quintiles of covariance risk also decrease with …nancial leverage, however, the magnitude of the decline is less. For example, in the lowest quintile of covariance risk, equity returns for …rms with little leverage equal 1.0 percent, while in the highest quintile, returns equal 0.5 percent. The di¤erence in equity returns between the low and high leverage portfolio for high and low covariance …rms equals 0.9 percent per month, and is statistically signi…cant. The empirical results are consistent with the analysis in Section Two, which shows that if investors derive utility from the downside loss protection of limited liability, the magnitude of the negative relation between risk and equity returns should be more pronounced for …rms with greater higher covariance risk.
Pre-ranking equity risk, …nancial leverage and …rm size
Agency costs that arise from asset substitution may also lead to a negative relation between equity returns and leverage. Firms with high default risk have the incentive to shift capital from low to high risk projects (Galai and Masulis (1976) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). If asset substitution occurs, then equity return variance should increase and average returns should decrease at higher levels of leverage. Table 1 , Panel B lists the standard deviation of equity returns for the covariance-leverage sorted portfolios. Within each quintile of covariance risk, equity return standard deviation varies little between …rms with low leverage and …rms with high leverage. Furthermore, in the highest covariance quintile, the portfolio standard deviation of the highest leverage portfolio is slightly lower than the standard deviation of the lowest leverage portfolio. Thus, it seems unlikely that shifts in asset variance related to asset substitution explain the negative return-leverage relation. Table 1 , Panel C lists the lagged equity covariance risk used to rank …rms in the portfolios.
Within each covariance quintile, there is little change in lagged covariance risk as leverage increases. Thus, it seems unlikely that the decline in returns is due to lower covariance risk for highly leveraged …rms. Table 1 , panel E contains the log size of companies in the covarianceleverage portfolios. Size decreases as covariance risk and leverage increase. For example, in the highest quintile of covariance risk, log size decreases from 12.4 for low leverage …rms to 12.2 for high leverage …rms. Thus, size e¤ects appear to not explain the negative relation between returns and …nancial leverage.
Covariance risk and …nancial leverage: Risk adjusted returns
Average equity returns decrease with …nancial leverage, and higher covariance risk …rms have more pronounced declines in average returns as …nancial leverage increases. The nega-tive relation is consistent with the notion that limited liability has greater value to investors when a …rm's asset systematic risk is higher. On the other hand, …rms'exposure to priced sources of risk may vary with leverage and equity covariance risk. Thus, I compute risk adjusted returns using a four-factor model in which returns load on the CRSP value-weighted return index (m), a portfolio of stocks with high book-to-market ratios minus portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market ratios (HML), a zero net investment portfolio of returns for small …rms and large …rms (SMB) (Fama and French (1993) and a momentum factor (Carhart (1997)) 7 .
OLS time-series regressions are estimated for each equity covariance-leverage sorted portfolio using:
where r i;t is the return for the i-th portfolio sorted on covariance risk and …nancial leverage, r f;t is the one month risk free rate (from CRSP) and i is the risk adjusted excess return.
I estimate the regressions for the full sample period, and use Newey-West standard errors computed with one lag of returns. (2004)). Furthermore, for high covariance …rms, loadings on HML are negative, and for the highest level of leverage, the loading is not signi…cant (Table 3, Panel D) . For instance, in highest quintile of equity covariance risk, the portfolios with the highest two quintiles of leverage have small, statistically insigni…cant loadings. Thus, it appears that for the highest covariance quintile, the relation between average equity returns and …nancial leverage does not appear to be explained by the e¤ects of HML. Table 3 shows the risk-adjusted returns for …rms partitioned by size. I de…ne small (large) …rms as those …rms whose equity market capitalization falls below (above) the median market capitalization for all …rms in a given month. I sort …rms based on the market capitalization from the previous month, then rank …rms by covariance risk and …nancial leverage (using the methodology outlined above), and form value weighted portfolios. For both large and small …rms, risk adjusted returns show a similar pattern.
Again, equity returns decline as leverage increases; the biggest declines occur for …rms with the highest covariance risk. In addition, the magnitude of the negative relation between equity returns and leverage decreases with …rm size. For large …rms in the highest quintile of covariance risk, the di¤erence in returns between high and low leverage portfolios equals 1.7 percent per month, while for small …rms, the di¤erence equals 2.4 percent per month;
both are statistically signi…cant. Table 4 lists risk adjusted returns for …rms partitioned by the level of R&D expenditures.
I proxy the intensity of R&D with the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets from the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial …le, and lag the R&D ratio six months. Each month, I
classify a …rm as R&D intensive if its R&D ratio exceeds the median for all …rms in the month. Within each group (R&D intensive and not intensive), I then rank …rms based on covariance risk and …nancial leverage, as discussed above. The results for both low and high R&D expenditures bear close resemblance to the results in Table 2 . Higher covariance risk …rms have greater declines in equity returns as leverage increases; the magnitude of the decline is similar for low and high R&D …rms. For …rms with low R&D expenditures and high covariance risk, the di¤erence in equity returns for low and high leverage quintiles equals -2.0 percent per month, while for high R&D expenditures, it equals -1.8 percent..
Conclusion
The point of this paper is simple: the downside loss protection limited liability plays an important role in determining expected equity returns. I show that in a single period model where a representative investor prices equity and debt claims to …rms assets, the hedging value of limited liability increases with the systematic risk of the underlying assets of the …rm. Two o¤setting forces interact as …nancial leverage increases. Increased exposure to systematic risk leads to expected equity returns increasing. In the opposite direction, the value of limited liability decreases expected returns. For high systematic risk …rms, the value of limited liability dominates compensation for bearing systematic risk. Thus, expected equity returns decline as leverage increases.
The empirical results match the predictions of the model. Average equity returns decrease with …nancial leverage, the decrease in returns is greatest for …rms with high equity systematic risk. Thus, the paper adds to the literature that examines the relation between equity returns and …nancial leverage or default risk. The consensus in this literature shows a negative relation between average equity returns and …nancial leverage or default risk.
Empirically, I contribute to this literature by identifying a key dimension through which variation of the negative relation can be observed: the negative relation is stronger for high systematic risk …rms. Importantly, this result, while consistent with the empirical predictions in my model, stand in contrast with other recent papers that provide an explanation for negative relation based on …nancial distress costs.
Appendix 1
The proof of Lemma 1 follows in two steps. First, Lemma A.1 establishes the covariance between an investor's marginal utility of wealth and …rm assets, when …rm assets are truncated at the face value of debt outstanding. The second step uses Lemma A.1 to evaluate the covariance between marginal utility and an equity payout.
Lemma A.1. Suppose …rm asset value, A, and the investor's wealth portfolio, W , are normally distributed.
The investor's marginal utility of wealth, u 0 (W ) ; is a di¤erentiable, Lebesgue measurable function with
where D is a scalar constant, W A is the covariance between asset value and wealth, A is the asset value standard deviation, N W is the value of wealth invested invested in the portfolio of risky assets. The Mill's ratio,
Proof. The covariance between W and A, given that A > D equals
where (W; AjA > D) is the joint normal distribution of W and A, given that A is truncated at D. Using Bayes rule, the covariance equals
I evaluate the integral in Equation A-7 using following results from Kotz et al. (2000, Ch. 46) . The marginal
where
The expectation of A given W and A > D equals
while the expectation of A given A > D is -12) where (y) is de…ned in Equation A-2. Thus, the covariance between W and A given A > D equals -13) where (W jA > D) is de…ned in Equation A-8. The expression may be evaluated as three separate integrals.
The …rst is
Equation A-16 follows from integration by parts. The second integral equals
The …nal integral is
Further algebraic simpli…cation gives -19) 23 where E n (u 0 (W )) is formed under a normal density with mean E (W ) 
W and A are normally distributed, so Stein's (1973) 
In addition, application of Stein's lemma to
Similarly,
Substituting Equations A-21 to A-23 into Equation A-19 leads to the result in Lemma A.1
Proof of Lemma 1 Lemma 1. Suppose …rm asset value, A, and the investor's wealth portfolio, W , are normally distributed.
The investor's marginal utility of wealth, u 0 (W ) ; is a di¤erentiable, Lebesgue measurable function with jE (u 00 (W ))j < 1. The covariance between u 0 (W ) and an equity claim that pays X = A D if A > D;
and zero otherwise, is
where W A is the covariance between asset value and wealth, A is the asset value standard deviation, P r (A > D) is the probability that equity holders avoid default, N W is the value of wealth invested invested in the portfolio of risky assets, and
Proof. The covariance between investor's marginal utility of wealth and an equity payout equals -27) where 1 A>D is an indicator function that equals 1 if A > D, and zero otherwise. The …rst covariance term in Equation A-27 equals
Therefore,
Equation A-30 is derived using the following relations
The second covariance term in Equation A-27 equals
Equation A-34 uses the identity , 1974 , to December, 2003 . Each month t, I sort firms into quintiles based on the equity covariance risk calculated using returns from t-36 to t-1. Within each quintile of covariance risk, I further sort firms into quintiles based on the level of debt-equity ratio at t-1. The debt-equity ratio equals short and long term debt divided by market value of equity. Quintile 1 contains firms with the lowest ranking. Quintile 5 contains firms with the highest ranking.
Monthly value weighted portfolio returns use equity returns from CRSP Monthly Stock file, and consists of firms from the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. Equity return standard deviation equals the sample standard deviation of portfolio returns. Lagged equity covariance risk is the cross-sectional sample covariance for firms within a given covarianceleverage portfolio. Similarly, financial leverage and size are calculated using the lagged crosssectional average. Diff equals the difference in portfolio returns between the first and fifth quintiles of financial leverage. T-statistics are in parentheses. Figure 1: Expected equity returns, firm leverage and systematic risk Figure 1 plots the relation between expected equity returns and leverage, given different levels of asset systematic risk. The dashed lines trace how expected equity returns vary with financial leverage. The solid line marks the inflection point at which expected equity returns decrease with financial leverage. Expected equity returns equal the expected equity payout divided by the equity price. The expected equity payout is:
The equity price (Equation 5) equals: Figure 1 uses the following parameters:
